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REVOLVING DOORS OF HOSPITALIZATION AND
INCARCERATION: HOW PERCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE AFFECT TREATMENT OUTCOMES
MARIA SLATER*
ABSTRACT
This Article compares the levels of procedural justice afforded
to persons with severe mental illness in the civil and criminal sys-
tems, either via involuntary commitment in state psychiatric hospi-
tals in the civil system or via mental health court as an alternative
to incarceration in the criminal system. Using Virginia’s mental
health courts and civil commitment systems as case studies, this
Article compares the procedures by which a person can be involun-
tary committed in the civil system with those afforded to persons
who are funneled into mental health treatment courts in the crimi-
nal system, analyzing how levels of procedural justice—both actual
and perceived—affect treatment outcomes. The underlying premise
of this Article is that the higher the level of perceived procedural
fairness, the higher the likelihood that a person with acute mental
illness will comply with treatment. This Article ultimately suggests
that certain aspects of procedural due process in the mental health
court model should be utilized in the civil commitment system in
order to effect positive treatment outcomes by increasing perceived
levels of procedural fairness and resultant buy-in to treatment.
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Dedicated to those who have frequented these revolving doors and to the caretakers who
persevere in tender-heartedly providing for their care and treatment.
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I. REVOLVING DOORS OF HOSPITALIZATION AND INCARCERATION
Mental health treatment for persons with acute mental illness
in the United States has experienced a major shift in the past half
century, from exclusive focus on institutionalized care in state
mental hospitals to deinstitutionalization and a move to the provi-
sion of community-based treatment and support.1 As a result, the
number of persons in state and county mental hospitals has dropped
dramatically.2 However, at the same time, the number of individuals
with severe mental illness in prisons and jails has risen drastically.3
Many individuals with severe mental illness rotate in and out of the
criminal justice system, arrested and charged for minor offenses—
offenses symptomatic of an underlying illness—and sentenced to
short periods in jail for low-level misdemeanors.4 All too often, these
individuals are back before the court shortly after their release, their
symptoms “undetectable during the cursory court process.”5 Instead
1. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, No. 197103, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CON-
SENSUS PROJECT 7 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197103.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PTC4-TC8R].
2. See id. (stating that the number of persons has dropped from 559,000 people in
1955 to less than 80,000 in 1999).
3. See John Monahan, Marvin Swartz & Richard J. Bonnie, Mandated Treatment
in the Community for People with Mental Disorders, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 28, 28 (2003)
(stating that a person with serious mental illness is almost five times more likely to be
incarcerated than admitted to a hospital or emergency medical center); see also Joseph
A. Migliozzi, Jr., An Effective Model for Misdemeanor Courts and the Mentally Ill
Defendant, VA. LAW., Dec. 2013, at 64, 64 (“Our jails have, effectively, become the new
state institutions for the mentally ill.”); COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 1, at xii,
4 (stating that according to studies, the prevalence of mental illness is three to four times
higher among inmates in jail and prison than in the general population, and almost half
of inmates with mental illness are incarcerated for non-violent crimes); MARGARET
CAMARENA, SOC. SCI. RSCH. CTR. AT OLD DOMINION UNIV., NORFOLK MENTAL HEALTH
COURT EVALUATION STUDY 7 (2007) (“By the end of 2000, there were nearly one million
people with mental illness in the criminal justice system.”).
4. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, A GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION xi (2005), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Programs
/Guide-MHC-Design.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCC7-KGAY]; see E. FULLER TORREY, AARON
D. KENNARD, DON ESLINGER, RICHARD LAMB & JAMES PAYLE, MORE MENTALLY ILL PER-
SONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 3–5, 9 (2010);
see also CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 6–7, 22 (noting the high rates of incarceration and
recidivism for those with mental illnesses).
5. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at xi. Inmates with a mental illness
are often released with little to no “supply of medications and enough money to take a
one-way trip on public transportation[,] [w]ithout housing, linkage to a community-based
mental health treatment program, or other much needed services.” COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, supra note 1, at 9.
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of deinstitutionalization, there has been a marked “re-institutionali-
zation” of persons with acute mental illness, from state psychiatric
hospitals to correctional institutions.6 In turn, stress, overcrowding,
and threats of violence in jail and prison often cause individuals with
acute mental illness to further deteriorate, interrupting what treat-
ment options may have been available and creating a vicious cycle
of repeated incarcerations.7 Aside from evaluations for legal compe-
tency, “most people with mental illnesses cycle through the [criminal
justice system] with little attention paid to their [underlying] condi-
tions.”8 For a fortunate few, mental health treatment court is offered
as an alternative to incarceration, allowing individuals to address
underlying mental illnesses causing this vicious cycle.9
Individuals who do not enter the criminal justice system often
enter a different set of revolving doors, admitted to hospitals and
emergency medical centers for short stays, medicated, and then re-
leased, only to be admitted again a short period later.10 In response,
many states have implemented involuntary commitment statutes,
using hospitalization as leverage to compel treatment as a means of
reducing relapse.11 Many persons involuntarily committed in the
civil system experience some form of leveraging by the state, whereby
deprivation is avoided and rewards are contingent on adherence to
mandated treatment.12 This treatment compelled by the state has
become an increasingly hot-button topic in mental health, as the
state’s interest in public safety and welfare clashes with individual
liberty interests.13
6. See Institute of L., Psyc. & Pub. Pol’y at U. Va., Three Virginia Jurisdictions Estab-
lish Specialized Mental Health Dockets, 31 DEVS. IN MENTAL HEALTH L., Feb. 2012, at
5, 6 (2012) [hereinafter ILPPP] (“In Virginia, the Department of Behavioral Health and
Developmental Services (“DBHDS”) surveyed its jail population in 2005 and . . .
determined that . . . 16% of its jail population, suffer from serious mental illness . . .
defined as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and depressive or
other mood disorders.”).
7. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at xi; see COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS,
supra note 1, at 5, 8–9, 102 (“Once incarcerated, people with mental illness become
especially vulnerable to assault or . . . intimidation by predatory inmates.”).
8. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at xi.
9. See ILPPP, supra note 6, at 6–7 (noting the limited number of jurisdictions in
which a mental health court or docket exists in Virginia).
10. Monahan et al., supra note 3, at 29–31 (referring to such individuals as “revolving-
door patients”); see also BRETT M. MERFISH, VIRGINIA CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURE
AND PRACTICE: POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE VOLUNTARY ADMIS-
SION 29 (2010) (referring to such individuals as “frequent flyers”).
11. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan, From Coercion to Contract: Re-
framing the Debate on Mandated Community Treatment for People with Mental Disorders,
29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485, 485–86, 498 (2005).
12. Id. at 485–86.
13. See id. at 499.
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This Article seeks to compare the procedure afforded to individ-
uals via involuntary commitment in the civil system and that af-
forded to them via mental health treatment courts in the criminal
system, analyzing the legal mechanisms by which leveraging is
applied in each system to gain adherence to treatment. This Article
then examines how levels of procedural protections afforded in each
system affect perceptions of procedural fairness and impact treat-
ment outcomes.14 Part II lays out the processes by which a person
can end up in mandated treatment via involuntary commitment in
the civil system versus mental health court in the criminal system.
Part III uses Virginia’s mental health court and civil commitment
systems as case studies, comparing the procedures by which a
person can be involuntarily committed with the procedures by which
a person can be funneled into mental health treatment court. Part
IV then analyzes how levels of procedural justice—both actual and
perceived—affect treatment outcomes. Part V suggests utilizing cer-
tain aspects of procedural due process afforded in the mental health
court model in the civil commitment system in order to effect posi-
tive treatment outcomes in the civil system by increasing perceived
levels of procedural fairness and resultant buy-in to treatment.
The underlying premise of this Article is that the higher the
level of perceived procedural fairness, the higher the likelihood that
a person with acute mental illness will comply with treatment.15
Mandated treatment in the civil system and mandated treatment in
the criminal system are, in reality, simply varying points of inter-
ception along the continuum at which individuals with mental illness
are diverted into treatment. While not disregarding the obvious
differences between mental health treatment compelled via involun-
tary commitment in the civil system versus treatment offered as an
alternative to incarceration in the criminal justice system, this Article
posits that these processes can be compared side-by-side instead of
analyzed in a vacuum. In so doing, this Article seeks to analyze how
levels of perceived procedural due process afforded in each can be
used to inform the treatment models of both and ultimately effect
positive outcomes.16
14. See id. at 498–99; see also Monahan et al., supra note 3, at 28, 34 (“[P]resumably,
some practices are likely to work better than others do—because they are more effective
or because they are more respectful of patients’ values and wishes, or both.”).
15. See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, John Petrila, Annette McGaha & Roger Boothroyd,
Perceived Coercion and Procedural Justice in the Broward Mental Health Court, 25 INT’L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 517, 521 (2002) (“[E]nhanced perceptions of procedural justice would
be ‘. . . likely to facilitate the subsequent therapeutic process.’”).
16. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 1, at 25 (depicting a flowchart of “select
events” that can lead a person with mental illness into the criminal justice system).
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II. MANDATED TREATMENT IN THE CIVIL V. CRIMINAL SYSTEMS
At the outset, it is important to note that there are obvious differ-
ences between mandated treatment in a mental health court and
mandated treatment in the civil system via civil commitment. The
mental health court treatment model utilizes the alternative of in-
carceration as leverage to gain compliance in treatment, whereas
the civil commitment system uses the threat of hospitalization as
leverage to gain compliance in treatment.17 Yet, the same actions on
an individual’s part can lead to either form of state-compelled treat-
ment. For instance, a person urinating on a street corner in public or
making lewd gestures to passersby could be taken by an officer to the
nearest hospital for psychiatric evaluation, hospitalized, involun-
tarily committed, and then offered outpatient treatment in the civil
system. Alternatively, that person could be arrested, charged with
public indecency, incarcerated, and subsequently offered the option
of participation in a mental health treatment court. In either sce-
nario, that individual’s actions may be symptomatic of an underlying,
untreated mental illness, yet those same actions can result in widely
disparate outcomes.18 A host of variables affect how law enforcement
responds to an individual with acute mental illness during that
individual’s initial interaction with the state, including the level of
crisis intervention training of the individual officer, the availability
of mental health resources in that community or jurisdiction, and
the ability of the officer to obtain an on-scene mental health
assessment.19 If the person is not diverted into the civil system prior
to entry into the criminal justice system, an even wider array of
variables come into play, such as the availability of mental health
clinicians to conduct immediate on-site assessments after arrest, the
ability to arrange for treatment as a condition of pretrial release,
and the amount of revenue available for administration and delivery
of mental health services in that jurisdiction.20
The many factors that determine when and whether an individual
with serious mental illness is diverted into mental health treatment
are outside the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article addresses
the levels of procedural protections afforded in the civil and criminal
systems once the state uses its police power to compel treatment,
analyzing how differences in the two systems can be used to inform
treatment outcomes.21
17. See Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 11, at 485–86.
18. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 1, at 6.
19. See id. at 4–5, 25.
20. See id. at 16–17, 25, 54.
21. See id. at 16, 19, 48–49.
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A. An Overview of the Civil Commitment Process
Many states have attempted to implement community-based
treatment programs, targeting individuals who repeatedly circulate
through local hospitals, emergency medical centers, and social welfare
systems.22 However, even where treatment options are available,
noncompliance with treatment often leads to repeated involuntary
hospitalizations for those with acute mental illness.23 Individuals
with mental illness often lack insight into their sickness and, as a
result, do not comply with taking medication or adhering to treat-
ment.24 This lack of insight is known as “anosognosia,” a neurologi-
cal deficit “affect[ting] the prefrontal cortex of the brain . . . used for
insight and understanding of one’s needs.”25 Because of this lack of
insight, a state may deem involuntary commitment necessary.26 Invol-
untary civil commitment is reserved for this group—those “‘severely
and persistently mentally ill’ individuals . . . who suffer from a DSM-
IV Axis I disorder[,] [which] includes schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar disorder, and major depression[,]” and who are
noncompliant with adhering to treatment or taking medication.27
Civil commitment laws vary by state, with most states authoriz-
ing three main forms of court-ordered involuntary treatment.28 The
first, and most immediate, involves individuals in acute mental health
crisis and emergency hospitalization, in which persons undergoing
an acute mental health crisis are admitted to a hospital emergency
room or other treatment facility for psychiatric evaluation for a short,
fixed period of time, often referred to as a “psychiatric hold.”29 After
the psychiatric hold period for evaluation, a judge can determine
22. Monahan et al., supra note 3, at 29.
23. Id. at 30, 33.
24. See id. at 36–37.
25. Christine Marie Sarteschi, Assessing the Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts:
A Meta-Analysis of Clinical and Recidivism Outcomes 40 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh) (ResearchGate).
26. Rachel A. Scherer, Toward a Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment Statute:
A Legal, Medical, and Policy Analysis of Preventive Outpatient Treatment, 4 IND.HEALTH
L. REV. 361, 375 (2007); see also MERFISH, supra note 10, at 4 (stating that “the most
prevalent barrier to voluntary treatment may not be readily remedied: it is individuals’
inability to identify their own conditions as problematic due to a lack of insight”).
27. Scherer, supra note 26, at 371–72, 375, 380.
28. Know the Laws in Your State, TREATMENTADVOC.CTR., https://www.treatmentad
vocacycenter.org/component/content/article/183-in-a crisis/1596-know-the-laws-in-your
-state [https://perma.cc/GW62-WTA8] (“Three forms of involuntary treatment are author-
ized by civil commitment laws in 46 states and the District of Columbia. Two forms are
available in Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Tennessee, where court-ordered
outpatient treatment has not yet been adopted.”).
29. Id.
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whether a person continues to meet the state’s civil commitment
criteria after the emergency evaluation period and can order further
hospital treatment for the individual.30 This process, the second form
of court-ordered involuntary treatment, is known as inpatient civil
commitment—or involuntary commitment—and “is practiced in all
states, but the standards that qualify an individual for it vary from
state to state.”31 The third type of civil commitment, practiced in all
but four states, is called outpatient civil commitment and “is a
treatment option in which a judge orders a qualifying person with
symptoms of mental illness to adhere to a mental health treatment
plan while living in the community.”32
Each state’s civil commitment statute and process is slightly
different. Twenty states incorporate some form of an understanding
of psychiatric deterioration when determining whether a person
should be civilly committed.33 Some states’ civil commitment stat-
utes allow consideration of treatment history and the likelihood of
future deterioration; seven states employ a standard requiring im-
minent harm to self or others to be eligible for civil commitment.34
As one study put it, “[t]he United States is effectively running [fifty]
different experiments, with no two states taking the same approach.”35
While involuntary commitment can and often does require in-
patient hospitalization, outpatient commitment statutes explicitly
use avoidance of hospitalization as leverage to coerce compliance with
treatment in the community.36 Outpatient mandated treatment usu-
ally is offered as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient hospital-
ization in one of three scenarios: as a less restrictive alternative to
inpatient hospitalization, through conditional release, or as a preven-
tive measure.37 A person who meets the statutory criteria for involun-




33. TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., GRADING THE STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF INVOLUNTARY
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT LAWS 1 (2018), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/stor
age/documents/2018_Grading_the_States.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK2D-MFES].
34. Id. at 1, 16.
35. Id. at 1.
36. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 1, at 48; TREATMENT ADVOC.CTR.,STATE
STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT: CIVIL COMMITMENT CRITERIA FOR INPATIENT OR
OUTPATIENTPSYCHIATRICTREATMENT2 (2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org
/storage/documents/Standards_-_The_Text-_June_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA5V-EK7J]
(stating that all states and the District of Columbia have statutes allowing court-ordered
inpatient treatment and that 45 states plus D.C. also have statutes governing court-
ordered outpatient treatment for those who meet the legal criteria); Bonnie & Monahan,
supra note 11, at 485.
37. Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 11, at 497–98.
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as a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization after an acute men-
tal health crisis, without ever undergoing inpatient commitment.38
In some states, outpatient commitment is available as a preventive
procedure, whereby a court can order that a person be involuntarily
committed before a psychiatric crisis has occurred if the court be-
lieves the person to be at such risk that involuntary commitment is
deemed necessary, but can offer mandated outpatient treatment as
a less restrictive option.39 Alternatively, an individual already in-
voluntarily committed to inpatient hospitalization may be offered a
conditional release, under which discharge from the hospital is
conditioned on continuing treatment in the community.40
B. Mental Health Treatment Courts in the Criminal Justice System
Individuals who do not enter the revolving set of hospital doors
via the civil commitment system may instead enter a different set
of revolving doors, rotating in and out of jails and prisons in the
criminal justice system as they incur repeated charges for behaviors
actually symptomatic of their underlying mental illness.41 Many
persons with serious mental illness are arrested for minor crimes
related to their untreated mental illness and based on an underly-
ing need for survival.42 If an individual is not intercepted and di-
verted into mental health treatment via the civil commitment
system, that individual instead likely will be funneled by law en-
forcement into the criminal system.43 Consider the hypothetical of
a person with serious mental illness urinating on a street corner in
public or making lewd gestures to passersby.44 If that person is not
diverted by law enforcement into hospitalization and treatment via
the civil commitment system, that individual is likely instead to be
arrested and charged with public indecency.45 Though the behavior
is the same in both scenarios, it can lead to widely divergent out-
comes: either hospitalization and civil commitment or incarceration.
For a fortunate few who do enter the criminal justice system, men-
tal health court treatment is offered as an alternative to incarcera-
tion, belatedly diverting such persons into mandated treatment.46
38. Id. at 498.
39. See id. at 499.
40. Id. at 497–98.
41. See Monahan et al., supra note 3, at 29; BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note
4, at xi.




46. See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at 2.
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Mental health courts initially developed in response to the over-
representation of people with mental illnesses in the criminal jus-
tice system, diverting select defendants with mental illness into
judicially supervised, community-based treatment.47 Part of the grow-
ing therapeutic jurisprudence movement,48 mental health courts
attempt to link persons with mental illness in the legal system with
other social services, addressing the underlying problems that led
to that individual’s involvement with the criminal justice system in
the first place.49 Defendants offered the option of mental health
court treatment work with a team of court and mental health pro-
fessionals under a treatment plan tailored to that individual, ap-
pearing at regular status hearings in mental health court and given
incentives and sanctions depending on that individual’s adherence
to treatment.50 Over 470 mental health treatment courts currently
operate in the United States in more than 45 states,51 with wide
variation in the type of charge accepted in each court, the treatment
options offered, the monitoring practices, and the adjudication model
used.52 For instance, while some mental health courts offer pre-
adjudication services, others are probation-based or only provide
services after a person has pled guilty.53
47. See, e.g., id. at 2–3.
48. Id. at 5 (stating that David Wexler, one of the founders of the movement in the
United States, describes therapeutic jurisprudence as “the study of the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent”).
49. See id.; see also Poythress et al., supra note 15, at 519 (stating that mental health
courts “abandoned much of the ‘formal lawyering’ and other stylistic aspects of a
traditional adversarial forum in favor of methods designed to” facilitate the individual’s
recovery via treatment).
50. See ROBERT V. WOLF, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, PRINCIPLES OF PROBLEM-
SOLVINGJUSTICE 3–4, 8 (2007), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Princi
ples.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PGU-XD3G].
51. Mental Health Treatment Court Locator, SUBSTANCEABUSE AND MENTALHEALTH
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (last visited Dec. 10, 2020), available at https://samhsa.gov
/gains-center/mental-health-treatment-court-locator.
52. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at v; Bonnie & Monahan, supra note
11, at 490 (“Mental health courts differ [in] . . . the type of charges accepted (felony or
misdemeanor), the type of adjudication model employed (pre or post-plea), the type of
sanctions used (jail or no-jail), and the type of supervision imposed (mental health or
criminal justice personnel).”).
53. LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUST. CTR.,
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A GUIDE TO RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRACTICE 12
(2009), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/CSG_MHC_Research
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPW8-NKC5]; see also MICHAEL THOMPSON, FRED OSHER & DENISE
TOMASINI-JOSHI, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, IMPROVING RESPONSES TO PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A MENTAL HEALTH COURT 4 (2005) (out-
lining potential legal outcomes for participation in a mental health court program). In
the pre-adjudication model, the prosecution of charges is suspended while participant is in
Mental Health Court (MHC) treatment; in the post-plea model, sentencing is suspended
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The likelihood of a person being funneled into a mental health
treatment court in the criminal justice system is extremely low.54
For a person to be offered the option of mental health court treat-
ment as an alternative to criminal adjudication of their offense in a
traditional court setting, two things must be true. First, a mental
health court or specialty docket must exist in the jurisdiction where
that person was charged (and/or convicted if in a mental health
court that is post-plea or probation-based). Second, that person must
be referred and accepted into the mental health court or docket once
in the criminal system.55 Even if a mental health court exists in that
jurisdiction and a person is referred to that specialty court, the
person must additionally agree to undergo treatment, the mental
health treatment team in that court must deem the person a good
candidate for treatment as an alternative to incarceration, and re-
sources must exist in the community linking that individual to
providers and services and thus making mental health court treat-
ment a viable option.56 Consequently, the likelihood of an individual
being funneled into mental health court treatment once in the crimi-
nal justice system is low, though the number of mental health
treatment courts in existence in the United States rises each year.57
Under the criteria and benchmarks for mental health courts out-
lined by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, courts are to give defen-
dants an informed choice in whether to participate in mental health
during treatment, and participation is taken into account in later sentencing. ALMQUIST
& DODD, supra note 53, at 13. In the probation model, treatment via the MHC is offered
in conjunction with probation. See Patricia A. Griffin, Henry J Steadman & John Petrila,
The Use of Criminal Charges and Sanctions in Mental Health Courts, 53 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 1285, 1286 (2002).
54. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 53, at 1. For instance, in Virginia, only seven
out of thirty-two judicial districts have established mental health dockets, and only one
out of thirty-one judicial circuits has an established mental health court. VA. DEP’T OF
BEHAV. HEALTH & DEV. SERVS., THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MENTAL HEALTH DOCKETS
IN VIRGINIA 7, 9–12 (2016), http://www.dbhds.virginia.gov/library/forensics/ofo%20%20
mental%20health%20docket%20report%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GQE-P2GA] (noting
the districts and circuit in Virginia in which mental health treatment dockets and court
exist); Virginia Courts in Brief, VA.’S JUD. SYS., http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/cib
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGB6-W7YM] (noting the number of judicial districts and circuits
in Virginia); Judge Tina Snee Leads New Mental Health Efforts in Fairfax County
Courts, FAIRFAX CNTY. VA. (May 7, 2019), https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/publicaffairs
/snee-leads-mental-health-efforts-courts [https://perma.cc/5DAL-TQGN]. Thus, an indi-
vidual in the criminal justice system in Virginia is unlikely even to have this option
available. See VA. DEP’T OF BEHAV. HEALTH & DEV. SERVS.,supra note 54, at 2.
55. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 3.
56. Id. at 3, 5.
57. See Carol Fisler, When Research Challenges Policy and Practice: Toward a New
Understanding of Mental Health Courts, JUDGES’ J., Sept. 2015, at 8, 8 (“A handful of
mental health courts were launched in the late 1990s, a few dozen by 2003, and by 2010
approximately 300 . . . .”); see also Mental Health Treatment Court Locator, supra note 51.
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court or to opt for routine criminal court processing.58 Mental health
advocates have expressed concern over the extent to which defen-
dants are actually informed of their choice in whether to participate
in mental health court or to opt for routine case processing.59 For
instance, in an investigation of a Broward County mental health court,
one study showed that 46.3% of respondents did not know that the
decision to participate in the mental health court program was op-
tional.60 The same study revealed that twenty-nine percent of defen-
dants did not realize participation was voluntary until after they had
agreed to participate.61
Data on mental health courts is also extremely limited.62 The
“supportive evidence base for [mental health courts] is sorely lack-
ing[,]”63 in part because few mental health courts exist, and in part
because few studies have been completed on the operation and impact
of those currently in operation. Moreover, the success or failure of
a mental health treatment court depends on the availability of mental
health services within that jurisdiction, and not solely on the mental
health treatment model used in that court.64 Thus, it is hard to pin-
point the extent to which failure in improving treatment outcomes
or reducing recidivism rates is attributable to lack of mental health
services in the area more generally versus the extent to which such
failures can be attributed to the mental health court itself.65
III. VIRGINIA AS A CASE STUDY
A. The Civil Commitment Process in Virginia
Virginia’s civil commitment process usually begins when an
individual is brought to a hospital emergency department or mental
health facility during a psychiatric crisis.66 A person can voluntarily
58. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 5.
59. See Sarteschi, supra note 25, at 44–45.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id.
62. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at v (“Program planners should also
be aware of the limited evidence base . . . .”).
63. Sarteschi, supra note 25, at 39; see also BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note
4, at v (noting lack of empirical studies on MHCs); Fisler, supra note 57, at 9 (“By 2010,
only a few studies of individual courts had provided evidence regarding the effectiveness
of the program model.”).
64. See, e.g., Sarteschi, supra note 25, at 76 (“[I]t can be argued that how well MHC
participants fare within a program is largely dependent on the nature of mental health
services facilitated by the MHC.”).
65. See id. at 42.
66. See NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC CRISIS AND CIVIL COM-
MITMENTPROCESS IN VIRGINIA 3 (2016), https://namivirginia.org/wp-content/uploads/sites
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seek help during a crisis, or if that individual is unwilling to un-
dergo an evaluation voluntarily, a magistrate can issue an emer-
gency custody order (ECO) permitting law enforcement to detain
and transport that individual to the hospital for a mental health
assessment.67 A magistrate may order an ECO upon the request of
relatives, law enforcement, or any other “responsible person.”68 Once
an ECO is ordered, a “pre-admission screener” is then obligated by
statute to provide emergency mental health services within eight
hours of the emergency custody order.69 If he or she deems it appro-
priate, the pre-admission screener can then request a temporary
detaining order from the local magistrate judge.70 Once a temporary
detaining order is ordered, Virginia law permits the individual to be
detained for up to seventy-two hours for evaluation and emergency
treatment.71 During this temporary detaining order period, an
independent examiner conducts a more extensive clinical evaluation
of the individual to determine whether he or she meets the statutory
criteria for involuntary inpatient admission to the hospital.72 If the
independent examiner independently finds that statutory commit-
ment criteria are met, he or she must certify this to the court,73 and
a civil commitment hearing must follow within the seventy-two-hour
temporary detaining order period.74 If the independent examiner does
not find that statutory commitment criteria are met, that individual
is released, obviating any need for a civil commitment hearing.75
Either a district court judge or special justice appointed by the
circuit court presides over an individual’s civil commitment proceed-
ing, which usually takes place at the hospital where the person has
/127/2016/03/GuidetoPsychiatricCrisisandCivilCommitmentProcessforWebsite-
justlawscriteria2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7H2-33H5].
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-808(A)–(C) (2020) (“[A] magistrate shall issue, upon the
sworn petition of any responsible person, treating physician, or upon his own motion, an
emergency custody order [upon] . . .probable cause . . . .”).
68. See id. § 37.2-808(A) (stating that any “responsible person” can petition the court
for an ECO).
69. Id. §§ 37.2-808(K), 37.2-809(A)–(B). This person is employed by the local com-
munity services board. § 37.2-809(A).
70. Id. § 37.2-809(B) (“A magistrate shall issue, upon the sworn petition of any
responsible person, treating physician, or upon his own motion and only after an evaluation
conducted in-person or by means of a two-way electronic video and audio communication
system as authorized in § 37.2-804.1 by an employee or a designee of the local community
services board to determine whether the person meets the criteria for temporary de-
tention, a temporary detention order if it appears [warranted] from all evidence readily
available . . . .”).
71. Id. § 37.2-809(H).
72. Id. §§ 37.2-809(H), 37.2-815, 37.2-816.
73. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-815(C), 37.2-817(A).
74. Id. § 37.2-814(A) (2020).
75. See id. § 37.2-815(B) (listing the examination considerations).
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been detained.76 At this hearing, the special justice may question
the petitioner, respondent, and any other family members or indi-
viduals testifying.77 The civil commitment process varies depending
on the jurisdiction in which it occurs.78 For instance, some Virginia
counties report utilizing the entire temporary detaining order period
before having the hearing to give an individual more time to become
open and receptive to the idea of treatment on an outpatient basis,
allowing an individual multiple opportunities before and during the
hearing to agree to voluntary commitment.79 Where more time is
given, a patient has more opportunity to stabilize after a psychiatric
crisis and more time in which to gain cognitive insight, which in-
creases that individual’s ability to understand the need for treatment
and agree to comply voluntarily.80 Other counties initiate civil commit-
ment hearings immediately after the temporary detaining order is
issued, offering few opportunities and little time in which a patient
can choose to voluntarily comply with treatment.81 Of the dispositions
recorded in Virginia in 2007, almost half resulted in a court order
for involuntary inpatient treatment, about six percent resulted in
court-ordered involuntary outpatient treatment, and about thirty
percent resulted in voluntary admission for inpatient treatment.82
Virginia’s civil commitment statute defines “mental illness” as
“a disorder of thought, mood, emotion, perception, or orientation that
significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize real-
ity, or ability to address basic life necessities and requires care and
treatment for the health, safety, or recovery of the individual or for the
safety of others.”83 In Virginia, before a person can be involuntarily
76. See id. § 37.2-815(A), (C); MERFISH, supra note 10, at 8.
77. See UNIV. VA. SCHS. OF L. & MED., A STUDY OF CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS
HELD IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DURING MAY 2007: A REPORT TO THE COM-
MISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM iii (2008), http://www.courts.state.va.us/pro
grams/concluded/cmh/reports/2007_05_civil_commitment_hearings.pdf [https://perma
.cc/48YQ-Z5RA].
78. See COMMONWEALTH VA. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH L. REFORM, PROGRESS RE-
PORT ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM (2009) 50 (2009) [hereinafter VA. COMM’N ON MEN-
TALHEALTH], http://www.courts.state.va.us/programs/concluded/cmh/reports/2009_prog
ress_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA9U-8U8G] (report of Prince William County CSB).
79. See id. at 45.
80. See id.
81. Contra id.
82. UNIV. VA. SCHS. OF L. & MED., supra note 77, at 16–17.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-100 (2020); see also BRUCE J. COHEN, RICARD J. BONNIE &
JOHN MONAHAN, UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING VIRGINIA’S NEW STATUTORY CIVIL
COMMITMENTCRITERIA 4 (2008), http://www.dbhds.virginia.gov/library/mental%20health
%20services/omg-understanding-and-applying-virginias-new-statutory-civil-commit
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UG3-SRTJ] (interpreting 2008 amendments made to the
statute’s language).
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committed, a judicial determination must be made by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person has a mental illness, and that this
mental illness presents:
[A] substantial likelihood that, as a result of mental illness, the
person will, in the near future, (1) cause serious physical harm to
himself or others as evidenced by recent behavior causing, at-
tempting, or threatening harm and other relevant information,
if any, or (2) suffer serious harm due to his lack of capacity to pro-
tect himself from harm or to provide for his basic human needs.84
In addition, Virginia’s involuntary commitment statute requires
that a person be in need of hospitalization and treatment and un-
willing to or incapable of volunteering for such treatment.85 If all of
these requirements are met and additionally “all available less re-
strictive treatment alternatives to involuntary inpatient treatment . . .
have been . . . determined to be inappropriate,”86 a judge or special
justice can “order that the person be admitted involuntarily to a
facility for a period of treatment not to exceed [thirty] days.”87
If an individual has already been involuntarily committed to
inpatient treatment in a hospital setting, that individual may be
offered mandatory outpatient treatment as a less restrictive alterna-
tive.88 Under the outpatient treatment model, a court can order that
an individual receive community-based treatment and that the per-
son be hospitalized if found not in compliance with such treatment.89
For outpatient treatment to be offered as a less restrictive alternative
to an individual, the judge or special justice must find, in addition
to the findings delineated above for involuntary inpatient treat-
ment, that:
(I) the person has a history of lack of compliance with treatment
for mental illness that at least twice within the past 36 months
has resulted in the person being subject to an order for involun-
tary admission pursuant to subsection C; (ii) in view of the person’s
treatment history and current behavior, the person is in need of
mandatory outpatient treatment following inpatient treatment
in order to prevent a relapse or deterioration that would be
likely to result in the person meeting the criteria for involuntary
inpatient treatment; (iii) as a result of mental illness, the person




88. Id. § 37.2-817(C1).
89. Id. § 37.2-817.1.
2021] REVOLVING DOORS OF HOSPITALIZATION AND INCARCERATION 275
is unlikely to voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment un-
less the court enters an order authorizing discharge to mandatory
outpatient treatment following inpatient treatment; and (iv) the
person is likely to benefit from mandatory outpatient treatment.90
In other words, if the judge finds that the individual has a
history of noncompliance but may benefit from outpatient commit-
ment based on this history, the judge can offer outpatient treatment
as an alternative.91 Typically, a special justice may recommend
mandated outpatient treatment at a civil commitment hearing when
an individual has had repeated involuntary hospitalizations and is
deemed in need of “encouragement” to participate in outpatient
treatment, when a person has shown noncompliance with outpatient
services in the past but seems willing to make greater efforts to
comply with mandated outpatient treatment, or when a person has
been discharged from the hospital but has failed to follow up with
mental health and psychiatric services after discharge, as an incen-
tive to comply with treatment in order to avoid being hospitalized
again.92 In this way, mandated outpatient treatment is used to pro-
vide “additional motivation for client[s] to attend services,”93 offering
outpatient treatment instead of hospitalizing a person every time
that individual is found out of compliance with treatment.
In practice, mandated outpatient treatment is often difficult to
implement due to lack of resources.94 For instance, the Fairfax-Falls
Church Community Services Board reported long waiting lists for
many services that would be appropriate for a client on an outpa-
tient basis, eliminating the ability to offer outpatient treatment to
individuals as a less restrictive alternative.95 Time constraints also
impede the process by which mandated outpatient treatment can
occur.96 Treatment providers are “required to draft a comprehensive
[mandatory outpatient] treatment plan within [five] days of the
commitment hearing,”97 an incredibly quick mandated turnaround
that in practice is hard to meet, as the local service providers, the
patient, and the magistrate judge must all agree on a treatment
plan before it is drafted.98 Mandated outpatient treatment is also
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(C1).
91. Id.
92. VA. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 44.
93. Id.




98. VA. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 45.
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utilized less frequently than inpatient commitment because of the
added burden on judges and community treatment providers.99 For
instance, some special justices do not order outpatient treatment
because mandated outpatient treatment cases “keep them on the
hook.”100 In other words, “[s]pecial justices are required to approve
of the comprehensive treatment plan . . . after the hearing occurs,
and are also responsible for overseeing the compliance process if [an
individual] is [found] noncompliant” during outpatient treatment,
obligating the justice to bear additional burdens of oversight through-
out the treatment process rather than solely during the commitment
hearing itself.101 Community service provider representatives have
also reported that special justices often do not order mandated
outpatient treatment because of the complicated steps involved in
such an order and because of fiscal restraints, as justices are not
given additional compensation for ordering outpatient treatment
rather than inpatient, though the outpatient process burdens that
justice with additional responsibilities.102
B. Virginia’s Mental Health Treatment Courts
In Virginia, the impetus to establish mental health courts began
after a task force was formed in 2002 to study ways to provide for
diversion and jail mental health services.103 The task force recom-
mended that Virginia establish mental health courts in selected lo-
calities,104 and a planning committee established Virginia’s first
mental health court in Norfolk in 2004.105 General district courts in
Petersburg, Richmond, and Norfolk later established specialty dockets
for channeling defendants into mental health treatment in 2011.106
Currently, thirteen operational mental health dockets exist in
Virginia, the most recent approved by the Virginia Supreme Court
for Fairfax County in 2019.107 For a person in Virginia to have the




103. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 7–8; see ILPPP, supra note 6, at 6–7; Migliozzi, supra
note 3, at 64.
104. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 7–8; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.35(4) (2020)
(“Subject to such rules as may be established pursuant to § 16.1-69.32, the chief judge
may establish special divisions of any general district court when the work of the court
may be more efficiently handled thereby . . . .”).
105. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 8; ILPPP, supra note 6, at 7.
106. ILPPP, supra note 6, at 6–7.
107. See Virginia Behavioral/Mental Health Dockets, VA.’S JUD. SYS., http://www
.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/sds/programs/bhd/advisory/bhd_direc
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option of mental health treatment instead of criminal adjudication
of their offense, a mental health court or docket must exist in that
jurisdiction, and that individual must be referred to the court or
docket by law enforcement, pretrial services staff, defense counsel, or
the judge.108 For instance, a judge may order a defendant be placed
on a mental health court docket if he or she determines there is a
“sufficient history of mental illness to warrant the community-based
services,” and in some district courts, defendants “evaluated for
competency or sanity [are] automatically referred to the [specialty
mental health] docket.”109
The Norfolk Mental Health Court (Norfolk MHC) follows a post-
plea model, meaning that a “defendant must first be found guilty
either after a plea or a trial” before being referred into mental health
court treatment in the Norfolk MHC.110 Defendants are only eligible
to participate if they have an Axis I diagnosis that is determined to
have been a factor in their arrest.111 Additionally, only those with
non-violent felonies and non-violent misdemeanor appeals to the
Circuit Court are eligible for the program, and individuals with a
prior record of violent offenses or sex offenses are not eligible.112
If a person agrees to participate in the Norfolk MHC, that
person is referred to the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office and the
mental health court team.113 Once the team agrees that the person
would likely be responsive to services, the person may then enter
the program.114 “[A] presentence report is prepared and sentencing
is set for a date one year after entry into the program.”115 Upon com-
pletion of the program, the defendant must still be sentenced based
on his or her previous conviction.116 However, if a defendant success-
fully completes the mental health treatment program, the finding
tory.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BP9-A3AN]; Reducing the Number of People with Mental
Illness in Jail, FAIRFAX CNTY. NEWS CTR. (May 9, 2019), https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov
/news2/fairfax-county-is-stepping-up-in-may/ [https://perma.cc/656M-GMY3].
108. See Virginia Behavioral/Mental Health Dockets, supra note 107; THOMPSON ET
AL., supra note 53, at 3; see also Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 65 (describing the manage-
ment of the docket).
109. Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 66 n.11.
110. ILPPP, supra note 6, at 7. The Norfolk Mental Health Court is a specialized
docket that funnels mentally ill offenders into its program; it is not an independently
operated or funded mental health court. See id.
111. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 9; see also Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 66 n.2 (defining
Axis I).
112. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id. If a case does not satisfy admissibility criteria, it is then sent back to the
circuit court. Id.
115. ILPPP, supra note 6, at 8; see CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 9.
116. See CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 10.
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of guilt prior to program entry may be vacated and another disposi-
tion imposed instead, such as a dismissal of the charge or conviction
of a lesser-included offense.117 The majority of defendants channeled
into the Norfolk MHC were found to have committed minor property
and drug crimes or minor assaults that were not premeditated and
were manifestations of their underlying diagnosis.118
A hypothetical helps illustrate the process of entering mental
health court. A defendant with paranoid schizophrenia may be
arrested and jailed for ten misdemeanor fire code violations.119 His
court-appointed attorney, recognizing his competence issues, requests
a court-ordered evaluation, after which he is diagnosed as having
paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorders but found competent
to stand trial on anti-psychotic medications.120 The court-appointed
public defender and prosecutor meet to recommend his sentencing
disposition.121 Taking into account the burden of providing incen-
tives for the defendant to continue his prescribed medication, the
need to assure stable housing for the defendant, and the need to find
necessary outpatient services, the defendant and prosecutor jointly
refer him to the mental health court or docket in that jurisdiction,
assuming one exists.122 The mental health treatment team, after
reviewing defendant’s case and history, agrees that the defendant
would be a good candidate for mental health court and forms a
tentative treatment plan.
At the mental health court hearing, the defendant is given the
option of continuing with regular trial in traditional court or of
pleading guilty to all charges and deferring the final disposition
during a twelve-month probationary period in mental health court
treatment.123 During this period, defendant would be released on
bail and required to attend regular meetings with local community
treatment providers, who would monitor his medication and psychi-
atric treatment.124 After considering, the defendant opts to plead
guilty and enter mental health court treatment, deferring sentenc-
ing for one year.125 During this period, defendant returns to court
117. Id.; ILPPP, supra note 6, at 8. If a defendant does not comply with his or her
treatment program, he or she is dropped from the program and sentenced in normal
circuit court. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 10.
118. Id. at 18.
119. Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 64.
120. Id. at 64–65.
121. See id. at 65.
122. See id.
123. See ILPPP, supra note 6, at 7–8.
124. Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 65.
125. See ILPPP, supra note 6, at 7–8.
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periodically, at first weekly and eventually monthly, and his case
manager reports to the mental health court judge on defendant’s
compliance with treatment.126 Defendant is informed that violations
of the treatment plan will result in an immediate violation hearing
in the mental health court, potential revocation of his bond status, and
conviction of the charges pending against him.127 The case manager
discusses with other members of the mental health treatment team
defendant’s compliance in taking prescribed medication and attending
meetings with doctors, therapists and support groups; the team rec-
ommends changes throughout the course of the year to appropri-
ately tailor the treatment plan.128 The team also suggests appropriate
actions to the judge to sanction and reward the defendant based on
compliance, and the mental health court judge allots sanctions and in-
centives based on these suggestions and his or her own observation of
the defendant’s compliance with treatment.129 At times, a short period
of jail time—usually about a week—is sanctioned for noncompliance.130
IV. COERCION AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Engagement in treatment is “strongly related to the belief about
the justice of the process by which the person was admitted.”131 This
concept is often referred to as “procedural justice,” or “the perceived
fairness of court procedure and [of] interpersonal treatment” as an
individual interacts with the state in receiving coerced or compelled
treatment.132 Carol Fisler, director of the Mental Health Court Pro-
grams at the Center for Court Innovation, describes this dynamic as:
126. See id. at 9.
127. Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 65.
128. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 15.
129. See id. at 12.
130. Id. at 4 (stating that over half of participants in the program for over nine months
had been jailed at some point for noncompliance).
131. MERFISH, supra note 10, at 4; see also Sarah M. Manchak, Jennifer L. Skeem &
Karen S. Rook, Care, Control, or Both? Characterizing Major Dimensions of the Mandated
Treatment, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 47, 49 (2014) (discussing the potential for negative
responses to feeling coerced into treatment); John Monahan, Charles W. Lidz, Steven K.
Hoge, Edward P. Mulvey, Marlene M. Eisenberg, Loren H. Roth, William P. Gardner,
& Nancy Bennett, Coercion in the Provision of Mental Health Services: The MacArthur
Studies, in RESEARCH IN COMMUNITY AND MENTAL HEALTH: COERCION IN MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES—INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 13, 26–27 (Joseph P. Morrissey & John Monahan
eds., 1999) (“[A] patient’s beliefs that others acted out of genuine concern, treated the
patient respectfully and in good faith, and afforded the patient a chance to tell his or her
side of the story, are associated with low levels of experienced coercion.”). “Procedural
justice” is used here to refer to a participant’s subjective experience and perception of
fairness in the case disposition process. Poythress et al., supra note 15, at 520.
132. Fisler, supra note 57, at 12.
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[Q]uite different from distributive justice, or the perceived sense
of the fairness of a final outcome (whether someone won or lost
a case). . . researchers have demonstrated a strong connection
between individuals’ perceptions of procedural justice and their
future attitudes and behavior . . . People who feel the legal system,
and their own treatment within it, to be fair will internalize the
values of the system, show greater compliance with court orders,
and be less likely to re-offend.133
Key factors affecting a person’s perception of procedural justice
in the civil or criminal system include: the level to which a person feels
they have been treated with dignity by the authoritative decision-
maker, the level to which a person feels they have a voice in the pro-
ceedings, whether that individual’s express preferences are respected,
the extent to which an individual is given decisional autonomy, and
whether the proceedings feel neutral, unbiased, and consistent
throughout treatment.134 If an individual perceives the process
through which a court mandates treatment as fair, that individual
is more likely to engage within and comply in the subsequent thera-
peutic process.135
State-compelled or coerced treatment can negatively affect
treatment outcomes, undermining the client-provider relationship
by “infusing an adversarial undercurrent into the process,” thereby
causing an individual to mistrust their treatment providers and the
mental health system generally.136 When an individual with a
serious mental illness feels compelled or coerced to take part in
treatment, that individual is more likely to resist treatment and less
likely to engage in therapeutic goals.137 Despite this, many states
have authorized the use of incentives and disincentives to promote
133. Id. at 9, 12.
134. Monahan et al., supra note 131, at 26–27; Poythress et al., supra note 15, at 520;
Fisler, supra note 57, at 12.
135. Poythress et al., supra note 15, at 521 (“[E]nhanced perceptions of procedural
justice [are] ‘. . . likely to facilitate the subsequent therapeutic process.’”).
136. MERFISH, supra note 10, at 3–4; Eric B. Elbogen, Jeffrey W. Swanson & Marvin
S. Swartz, Effects of Legal Mechanisms on Perceived Coercion and Treatment Adherence
Among Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 191 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 629, 635
(2003) (stating that studies indicate that some types of leveraging are “perceived as so
coercive for some patients that they become mistrustful of the mental health system”
and of treatment providers and drop out of services entirely).
137. Manchak et al., supra note 131, at 49; see also MERFISH, supra note 10, at 3–4
(“Mandated treatment has been linked to poorer clinical outcomes including non-
adherence as well as an increased chance that mental health services consumers will be
involuntarily committed in the future . . . There is some evidence that the disempower-
ment of individuals resulting from the coercive nature of the civil admission process
prevents them from fully participating in any subsequent care rendered.”).
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adherence to treatment.138 As Professors Bonnie and Monahan note,
“[a]pproximately half the people receiving treatment in the public
sector for mental disorder have experienced some form of ‘leverage’
in which deprivations such as jail or hospitalization have been
avoided, or rewards such as money or housing have been obtained,
contingent on treatment adherence.”139 Though a more assertive
approach may coerce treatment, treatment outcome is greatly affected
by the way in which such treatment is mandated—how leverage is
used and the effects of this on an individual’s perception of procedural
justice in the treatment process.140 Moreover, while early studies
focused on the voluntary or involuntary nature of commitment as an
indicator of subsequent treatment compliance, more recent studies
demonstrate that “if anything, mandated treatment relationships
are slightly more affiliative than voluntary ones.”141 In other words,
some studies show mandated treatment relationships as having
better treatment outcomes than those entered into voluntarily.142
So how can this inform involuntary treatment in the civil and
criminal contexts? Legal mechanisms determine the process af-
forded to an individual, as the state compels their treatment.143 In
turn, perceptions of the procedural fairness of these legal mecha-
nisms can greatly affect compliance and resulting treatment out-
comes.144 Therefore, understanding what forms of leveraging are
more likely to engender adherence in treatment and what forms of
leveraging decrease compliance is crucial for informing treatment
methods and outcomes.145
Some amount of leveraging has actually been shown to improve
treatment outcomes.146 For instance, a meta-analysis of twenty-five
studies of mental health courts found that treatment programs that
were not entirely voluntary had higher rates of reduced recidivism
138. Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 11, at 485.
139. Id.
140. See Manchak et al., supra note 131, at 48–49.
141. Id. at 53 (showing that mandated treatment relationships scored slightly higher
on pure affiliation with the therapist, affiliative autonomy felt, client pure affiliation,
and affiliative submission to the treatment and therapy). But see MERFISH, supra note
10, at 3–4.
142. See id.
143. Elbogen et al., supra note 136, at 629.
144. See id. at 636.
145. See Monahan et al., supra note 3, at 37 (“It is unfortunate that instruments of
therapeutic leverage, including incentives and disincentives as well as mandates, are not
often mentioned in studies of interventions that aim to facilitate treatment adherence.
Rectifying this omission is especially important in the context of mental health care.”).
146. See Michelle Edgely, Why Do Mental Health Courts Work? A Confluence of
Treatment, Support and Adroit Judicial Supervision, 37 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 572,
572 (2014).
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than programs that were entirely voluntary.147 Each study in the
meta-analysis examined levels of voluntariness in rehabilitative
programs for offenders with mental disorders, with programs desig-
nated as “voluntary, somewhat voluntary or involuntary.”148 Programs
designated as “somewhat voluntary” were found to have higher rates
of reduced recidivism than completely voluntary and involuntary
programs.149 Thus, some amount of coercion positively correlated
with adherence to treatment.150 Because participation is leveraged
with the alternative of incarceration in the mental health court model,
the mental health court model falls into the category of “somewhat
voluntary:” Offenders choose between participation in mental health
court or mainstream case processing.151 While the leveraging in-
volved in mandated treatment is often framed as coercive, for indi-
viduals with severe mental illness, whose choices are limited to
begin with, offering the option of mental health court treatment
often expands their already constrained range of choice.152 As re-
searchers Scott and Stuntz explain, “[a] person with few and unpal-
atable choices may live in a coercive environment. An offer that
exploits those circumstances is nevertheless value enhancing, and
enforcement is appropriate. More choices are better, even—perhaps
especially—if one has few to begin with.”153 While coercive, man-
dated treatment can act to expand the range of choice for a person
offered the option of mental health treatment court, rather than
constricting that range.154 Additionally, because social networks for
incarcerated individuals are often very limited, service providers in
mental health courts are more likely to be perceived as extremely
“positive” individuals in that network.155
In contrast, persons involuntarily committed in the civil system
have access to a potentially wider social network; thus, outpatient
treatment, though a less restrictive alternative to inpatient hospital-
ization, may not be perceived as expanding the range of choice for an
individual who, if not at risk of being committed, would otherwise be
free from the state’s influence in their medical decision-making.156





152. See Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 11, at 487.
153. Id. (quoting R.E. Scott & W.J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALEL.J.
1909, 1920 (1992)).
154. Id.
155. Manchak et al., supra note 131, at 54.
156. MERFISH, supra note 10, at 4.
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Rather than feeling an expanded range of choice in the civil commit-
ment system, patients often feel disempowered and voiceless in the
process.157 In part, this is because it is difficult for patients to appeal
a commitment determination and “civil commitment law is not often
subject to independent judicial review.”158 Thus, appeals of decisions
at a hearing are rare, often leaving participants feeling that they
are without a voice in challenging any decisions made.159
Ironically, adding more procedural requirements in efforts to
enhance procedural fairness often does more harm than good.160
Stricter civil commitment laws are correlated with higher rates of
incarceration of mentally ill individuals.161 This is because the more
steps involved in the civil commitment process, the less likely a
person who is decompensating but refusing to be voluntarily admitted
to a hospital will meet the criteria for involuntary commitment.162
As John Oliver points out in his article examining this, “Virginia’s
requirement that there be probable cause for finding a ‘substantial
likelihood’ of ‘harm’ before an ECO can be issued for a person [by a
magistrate] . . . has been criticized” as too high of a bar in emergency
situations, “preventing more timely intervention for someone . . . in
crisis” who needs treatment but lacks awareness of their illness and
refuses help.163 Certain studies report mental health workers pur-
posely re-incarcerating clients in order to get them to access mental
health services, finding it “easier to access mental health treatment
from the jail facility than to attempt involuntary commitment to a
mental institution.”164 Thus, adding procedural protections in the
civil commitment process can have adverse effects, costing both time
and resources, impeding access to needed mental health resources,
and limiting the care available to individuals in emergency situa-
tions.165 However, though adding procedural safeguards to the civil
157. Id.
158. Id. at 33.
159. See id.
160. See VA. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 44.
161. See Sarteschi, supra note 25, at 15–16.
162. See id.; see also VA. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 44 (pointing
out that special justices “don’t want the headache” involved in ordering mandatory
outpatient treatment (MOT)).
163. John E. Oliver, Responding to Concerned Family Members During a Mental
Health Crisis: Reflections on a Critical Incident, 34 DEVS. IN MENTAL HEALTH L., Dec.
2015, at 1, 1–2, 5 (recounting a mother’s failed attempt to commit her daughter three
days after her daughter was discharged from her fourteenth psychiatric hospitalization,
the magistrate’s refusal to issue an ECO, and her daughter’s subsequent suicide).
164. Sarteschi, supra note 25, at 15–16.
165. See MERFISH, supra note 10, at 5; see also Samuel Jan Brakel, Searching for the
Therapy in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
455, 475 (2007) (“The U.S. Supreme Court, not known for endorsing the civil libertarian
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commitment model may not result in better treatment outcomes,
there are striking differences between the civil and criminal systems’
compelled treatment models that can be used to inform procedural
protections in the civil commitment process.
V. USING DIFFERENCES TO INFORM TREATMENT MODELS
Key factors differ in the criminal system versus the civil system
that affect perceptions of procedural justice in each. These factors
are: the range of choice and voice afforded to the participant in each
system, the relationship of the participant with the judge in each
model, and the expanded access to services in the mental health court
model—services which are noticeably absent in the involuntary com-
mitment model.166 If incorporated into the civil commitment model,
all three of these factors in the mental health court model could have
positive effects on treatment outcomes in the civil commitment model.
A. Relationship with the Judge
The first and most important difference involves relationship
development with a person in authority. Studies show that the rela-
tionship between the presiding judge and an individual can greatly
affect treatment outcomes.167 In a study of the progress of a cohort
of program participants in Norfolk’s Mental Health Treatment Court
(Norfolk MHC), participants reported that the support they received
from the presiding judge was crucial in helping them stabilize and
that the close, ongoing supervision provided by case managers and
regular meetings with the judge and probation officer were critical
to compliance with conditional treatment plans.168 This report is simi-
lar to findings in other therapeutic court models, with participants
citing an ongoing relationship with the judge as critical to recovery.169
For instance, the National Institute of Justice found in its study of
therapeutic courts that “interactions with the drug court judge [was]
one of the most important factors influencing participants’ drug
agenda in mental health, has (unwittingly it would seem) contributed to discouraging
access to psychiatric care by burdening even voluntary admissions with potentially
heavy-handed procedural and/or substantive process requirements.”).
166. See CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 28–29.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 3 (focusing on a cohort over a period of eighteen months in 2006 and 2007).
This is affirmed by studies of participants in mental health treatment court in New
York, who reported on the value to their overall treatment of direct conversations with
the presiding judge in asking questions about their progress and problems. Id. at 29.
169. See, e.g., id. at 7, 29 (citing other such studies).
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court experience.”170 The Norfolk Mental Health Court study con-
firms the importance of this ongoing relationship with the judge,
with Norfolk MHC participants citing as imperative to the process
the support they received from the presiding judge and “the fact
that [the judge] had continued to be supportive even when they had
violated one of the conditions of their probation.”171
One of the most important features of the Norfolk MHC, reported
as directly contributing to successful treatment outcomes, was that
the judge gave people “second chances,” letting them remain in the
program even if they were found out of compliance, so long as they
maintained their commitment to their overall treatment plan.172
Comments by participants in the study indicated that the judge’s
reputation for strict enforcement, combined with perceptions of fair
treatment, gained their compliance with the program’s rules and
regulations: participants knew that noncompliance would be sanc-
tioned and knew that sanctions were applied consistently.173 Com-
ments also indicated that participants respected the judge’s decisions
and felt personally accountable to the judge because of the ongoing
relationship they had developed with that judge.174 Having direct
conversation with the judge, having the judge ask them about their
progress, and having the judge care about the problems they were
facing made participants feel respected and personally accountable
to that judge.175 Third-party observations of interactions between
participants and the judge in the Norfolk MHC conducted over time
confirm the significance of this relationship.176 These observations
found that initially, participants were often reserved, responding
succinctly to the judge’s questions and seemingly not invested in
treatment, but that over time, as the judge developed a relationship
with participants, participants began to share more information
with the judge in their mental health court, and consequently had
more buy-in to the treatment program.177
The relationship with a single judge rather than multiple author-
itative figures also is key to whether such a relationship becomes a
170. Id. at 7.
171. Id. at 16.
172. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 20.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 29.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 29 (“The change in the interaction between the male participants and the
judge was particularly dramatic . . . regular interaction with a single judge also might
be important because it promotes effective judicial supervision, continuity of monitoring,
and consistency in practices and application of sanctions.”).
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positive and influential factor in treatment outcomes.178 Studies
demonstrate that “the more judges [an] offender[] deal[s] with, the
greater the likelihood of poor treatment attendance[]” and that,
correspondingly, “[o]ffenders who participate in courts where there is
only one judge are far less likely to be terminated early or to miss . . .
treatment sessions than those exposed to multiple judges.”179 Testi-
mony of a mental health court judge in New York reinforces the
importance of this personal connection, with the judge explaining
that he interacted with participants as a way “‘to engage them human
to human,’ and to compensate for the fact that they had been given
short shrift all their lives and to give them hope.”180
Judge Migliozzi, a judge for the Norfolk General District Court
mental health docket, noted that in the mental health court docket
model in Virginia, the specialty docket procedure “provides an iso-
lated and dignified opportunity for defendants’ family members to
be present and to offer background information and suggestions to
the court in an effort to determine an appropriate sentencing disposi-
tion.”181 It was this dignity and the privacy afforded to defendants
in Virginia’s mental health court docket that the judge found most
important in making the docket work.182 The judge went on to note
“that family members in attendance provid[ed] the greatest service”
to the mental health court docket and that the specialty docket
allowed family members to do so in a way that avoided the embar-
rassment of personal issues being “paraded before a packed courtroom
of less sensitive citizens.”183
The civil commitment model lacks an equivalent ongoing rela-
tionship with the special justice involved in the hearing process.184
It also lacks similar dignity-enhancing procedures.185 This ongoing
relationship with a single judge may be the single greatest difference
affecting lower perceptions of procedural fairness in the civil com-
mitment system. Although case managers and treatment teams pro-
vide ongoing, regular supervision in mandated outpatient treatment,
there is no similar ongoing relationship with the judge mandating
that treatment, and individuals often interact with a different special
justice every time they are re-hospitalized and re-committed.186 That
178. See CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 29.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 65–66.
182. See id. at 65.
183. Id. at 65.
184. See MERFISH, supra note 10, at 27, 30.
185. Id. at ii, 11–12.
186. See CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 4; Scherer, supra note 26, at 428–29; Monahan
et al., supra note 3, at 33.
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there is not a comparable equivalent in the civil commitment model
may play into the lowered perceptions of procedural justice reported
in the civil commitment process, as participants do not have an on-
going relationship with an authoritative figure able to imbue the
process with an attitude of impartiality and positive influence. Be-
cause there is no ongoing judge in the civil commitment model, it is
also less likely that decisions regarding court-ordered treatment will
be consistent over time for individuals compelled into treatment.
B. Access to Services
The second difference in treatment model between civil commit-
ment and mental health treatment court involves access to services.
Persons involved in mandated outpatient treatment often go through
the same onerous process of hospitalization in order to receive emer-
gency services every time they have a psychotic episode, stop taking
medication, or are found out of compliance with treatment.187 More-
over, individuals in the civil commitment system experience diffi-
culty in gaining access to services each time they relapse.188 In a
survey of service providers in Virginia, many respondents reported
that even if the civil commitment system worked more efficiently,
their local community-based services would not be adequately pre-
pared to handle additional cases if mandated outpatient treatment
was ordered more frequently by the special justice in that jurisdic-
tion.189 For instance, respondents in the Norfolk Mental Health
Court study reported difficulty in gaining access to more intensive
residential treatment due to limited beds in public facilities and
high costs at private facilities.190 Lack of available resources in turn
affected access to needed medications.191 Indeed, the study reported
that for some participants, the only way to gain access to resources
needed for treatment was through the local jail—and noticeably, not
through the civil commitment process.192
In contrast, once in the Norfolk Mental Health Court, partici-
pants had greater access to therapeutic and treatment services.193
Greater access to services resulted in part because of connections of
case managers, persons on the mental health court team, and the
presiding judge with local treatment providers.194 In other words,
187. See VA. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 44.
188. See Monahan et al., supra note 3, at 33.
189. VA. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 43.
190. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 17.
191. Id. at 19.
192. Id. at 17.
193. Id. at 16.
194. Id. at 28.
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participation in the Norfolk Mental Health Court allowed participants
a better chance of accessing such services because of the collaboration
between the circuit court and local community treatment providers—a
much higher chance than trying to access such services on their
own.195 In some cases, the judge could “intervene to ensure that
service providers responded to requests for assistance,” using his or
her influence to ensure participants received treatment that, on their
own, they would be unlikely to access.196 When asked why they de-
cided to participate in the Norfolk Mental Health Court, almost as
many participants reported wanting access to services as those who
reported not wanting to go to jail as their primary motivation.197
While in the mental health court model, the presiding “judge’s
interpersonal skills and ability to resolve legal problems expeditiously
and to facilitate access to services”198 enabled treatment to continue
even when participants fell out of compliance, an equivalent figure
with the capacity to expediate re-entry into treatment after non-
adherence is noticeably lacking in the civil commitment model. Be-
cause of the lack of a figure that provides continuity in an individual’s
treatment plan and monitoring over time, services are harder to
access in the civil commitment model, efficiency impeded, and consis-
tency lacking in each run-in with the civil commitment system.199
It should be pointed out that lack of access to resources can
provide reverse incentives. For instance, concerns have been raised
over the channeling of individuals with serious mental illness into
the criminal justice system due to lack of stable placement or ser-
vices upon release.200 The Bazelon Center has noted “the potential
of mental health courts to encourage arrest as a strategy for access-
ing mental health services that are not otherwise available”201 and
the temptation of sentencing a person with acute mental health
issues to the maximum time when they otherwise would not have
been in order to coerce participation in mental health court treat-
ment over routine criminal processing.202 While beyond the scope of
this Article, this issue is noteworthy, as are the efforts that have
been made to address these patterns.203 This Article focuses instead
195. Id.
196. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 28.
197. Id. at 15 (reporting 8 and 10 out of 23, respectively).
198. Id. at 29.
199. See id. at 29 (discussing the importance of judicial interactions).
200. Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 11, at 492.
201. Id. at 492; see Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health
Courts, 11 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & L. 507, 519–20 (2005).
202. Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 11, at 493; see also Sarteschi, supra note 25, at
42 (noting that over half of the twenty MHCs studied required a guilty or no contest plea
as a condition of participation in the MHC program).
203. See INST. OF L., PSYCH. & PUB. POL’Y AT UNIV. OF VA., The SJ 47 Subcommittee to
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on what occurs after an individual has been funneled into the sys-
tem via civil commitment or mental health court as an alternative
to incarceration.
C. Choice Afforded in the Process
The third factor that differs between the models is the range of
choice and voice afforded in each process. One factor adding to the
disempowerment and voicelessness patients often feel in the civil
commitment process is bias on the justice’s part in civil commitment
hearings.204 This concept, often referred to as the “attitudinal predi-
lections” of special justices, may contribute to the lack of choice or
voice felt by participants in the civil commitment process, reinforc-
ing feelings of disempowerment and constriction.205 For instance, a
study of special justices presiding over civil commitment hearings
in Virginia revealed that many special justices entered into the
hearings with a strong predilection that commitment would result,
holding cursory hearings as a matter of procedure but interacting
little with the individual or with treatment providers in reaching
the decision.206 While some special justices required second evalua-
tions of the patient and engaged in more extensive questioning of
the community treatment providers and the patient, others report-
edly entered the hearing process and performed no additional evalu-
ations or mental health screenings of the individual; instead they
proceeded with the hearing soon after the temporary detaining order
was ordered and before the individual had a chance to stabilize and
opt for voluntary treatment.207
Added to this, few special justices offered opportunities through-
out the hearing for the patient to choose to commit him or herself
voluntarily, although this legal mechanism is available and could
operate to expand the range of choice for that individual.208 Instead,
Study Mental Health Services in the Commonwealth in the 21st Century, 34 DEVS. IN
MENTAL HEALTH L., Dec. 2015, at 6, 8–9 (recounting challenges presented by the large
number of individuals with serious mental illness in Virginia jails and prisons and
experts’ recommendations on ways to divert such persons from the criminal justice
system into treatment).
204. See MERFISH, supra note 10, at 32.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 30 & n.140 (noting information gathered from surveys of fifteen special
justices from areas with high rates of involuntary commitment).
207. See id. at 30 & n.141 (noting information gathered from surveys of thirteen
justices from areas with low rates of involuntary commitment); see also VA. COMM’N ON
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 44 (describing how some justices find the statutes for
mandated outpatient treatment to contain too many complicated steps).
208. See MERFISH, supra note 10, at 8, 30, 33. The counties in Virginia in which MOTs
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many justices offered the option of voluntary commitment merely as
a matter of procedure and only at the beginning of the hearing, which,
if it occurred on the heels of the temporary detaining order, gave the
individual little time to become receptive to the idea of voluntarily
receiving treatment.209 Because of the attitudinal predilection of many
justices at these hearings and the lack of procedure through which
to appeal decisions once made, many patients viewed the commitment
process as arbitrary and disempowering, completely dependent on
the special justice in their jurisdiction, and without recourse if decided
incorrectly.210 These factors ultimately contribute to lowering levels
of perceived procedural fairness in the civil commitment system.
In contrast, judges in mental health treatment courts often
provided opportunities not only for participants themselves to have
a voice in the process, but for their family members to also provide
background information and suggestions to the court in an effort to
determine the best course of treatment and sentencing disposition
for each participant.211 Having direct conversations with the judge,
having the judge ask them about their progress, and having the
judge care about the problems they were facing made participants
feel respected and personally accountable to that judge, and in turn
made participants feel like they had a voice in their mental health
treatment and progress.212
It should be noted that although mandated treatment can act
to expand the range of choice for a person who opts for mental
health treatment court in the criminal justice system as an alterna-
tive to incarceration or other punishment, this is rarely true for a
person involuntarily committed via the civil system, who, but for
such commitment, would otherwise be free from the state’s influence
in their decision-making.213 However, the extreme limitations,
rather than expansions, put on a person’s choice in the civil commit-
ment process can at least be mitigated by ensuring that the judges
presiding over their civil commitment hearings do not have a predi-
lection towards one outcome, but instead come into the hearing with
no “attitudinal predilection” towards commitment—or at least with
a semblance of outward neutrality so that persons facing involun-
tary commitment do not believe that the outcome has been decided
are ordered more frequently report that “[w]ith few exceptions, clients who are under
[Mandated Outpatient Treatment] orders . . . [are] very cooperative with treatment.” VA.
COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 78, at 45.
209. See MERFISH, supra note 10, at ii, 8, 30.
210. See id. at 4, 32–33.
211. Migliozzi, supra note 3, at 65.
212. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 29.
213. See Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 11, at 487.
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before they have had a chance to say a word.214 At the very least,
individuals facing involuntary civil commitment should be given the
chance at their hearing to provide information on their own back-
ground, to have family members to speak on their behalf, and to be
presented the option of voluntary buy-in to treatment at multiple
points throughout the process.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Borrowing from the successes of the mental health treatment
court model, this Article recommends the following changes to the
mandated outpatient treatment model:
(1) Make efforts to have the same special justice as-
signed to an individual who is frequently hospitalized under
a temporary detaining order in order to provide continuity
in commitment hearings over time. Make concerted efforts
to have the same special justice preside at each civil com-
mitment hearing for that individual so that the individual
can establish an ongoing relationship with that special
justice, enabling the individual to feel personal account-
ability to the judge in complying with treatment and shift-
ing that individual’s perceptions of procedural justice in the
civil commitment process over time. Having the same special
justice involved in each hearing can allow a patient to de-
velop an ongoing relationship with a single special justice,
making them more likely to view that authoritative figure as
a positive influence, to engage in treatment, and to feel per-
sonal accountability for relapses in treatment compliance.
Having the same special justice involved in each hearing
also increases the likelihood of consistency in decision-mak-
ing, and thus it may improve that individual’s perception of
procedural fairness in the civil commitment process, mak-
ing them more likely to comply with mandated treatment.
(2) Allow an individual multiple opportunities through-
out the temporary detaining order period and the civil
commitment hearing process to choose to commit him or
herself voluntarily. The opportunity should be afforded to
an individual immediately before the hearing, at different
points throughout the hearing, and immediately before a
final order of involuntary commitment, thus giving an
214. See MERFISH, supra note 10, at 32–33.
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individual multiple opportunities to become open to the
possibility of voluntarily complying with treatment, ex-
panding that individual’s range of choice, and allowing him
or her more of a voice throughout the process.
While the complexities of mandated mental health treatment
in both the civil and criminal systems cannot be compounded into
quick solutions or simple fixes, procedural mechanisms and treat-
ment methods in the mental health court model can inform the civil
commitment model. Allowing individuals a greater voice and ex-
panding range of choice in the civil commitment process can lead to
improved perceptions of procedural justice, thereby increasing
engagement in treatment. Additionally, establishing mechanisms
for an ongoing relationship with the special justice involved in each
civil commitment hearing of an individual can allow for a more
positive relationship to develop with the authoritative decision-
maker, for more consistency in decision-making regarding treat-
ment, and consequently, for higher levels of perceived procedural
fairness and buy-in of that individual. The single, most critical factor
shown in the mental health court treatment model that engenders
compliance and effects positive treatment outcomes for persons with
serious mental illness is the ongoing relationship with a single ju-
dicial figure.215 Thus, having one special justice preside over all civil
commitment hearings for that individual in the civil commitment
process is likely to improve an individual’s compliance with treat-
ment over time. Enabling this ongoing relationship is the single great-
est step that can be taken to improve the civil commitment process
and effectuate more positive treatment outcomes, decreasing the
number of individuals entering the revolving doors of the civil sys-
tem over time.
215. CAMARENA, supra note 3, at 28–29.
